Cognition of Cognizing Psyches, its nature and epistemology

CP cognition is a phenomenon that can be elaborated using a combination of and modern science concepts and Aristotelian concepts, recognizing that Aristotle's thought is valued and even prestigious in major religious traditions (notably both Christianity and Islam), . The analysis of CP cognition can provide a set of useful distinctions in wider ethical debates, for example those triggered by rapid changes in biotechnology.

The basic idea is that hominins evolved with a capacity to recognize the unseen causes of the behavior of other hominins. The mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions-in-action, plans, volitional-thoughts, memories of perception, memories of thought experience, etc) recognized by folk psychology are mental types, properties of an unseen mental entity that causes hominin behavior. In the terminology of Aristotle, this is a rational psuchos. The innervated bodies of hominins (including a brain made of neurons, that somehow "represents" information about the world with mental states) is a seen entity with behavior, and the behavior is caused by an unseen psyche that is nevertheless reliably cognized by (non-autistic) hominins.

Transitional Pinyin, a mixed semantic orthography

I propose that some Web pages of interest to learners of Chinese language be made available in a new intermediate orthography that mixes Han Chinese characters and Latin letters. The new orthography can have several stages of difficulty, for learners at different levels. Certain words or elements that are targets for learning will have an special underline (or other visual indicator) so that a mouse over the target will cause additional information to pop up.

The orthography is nor phonologically regular like Pinyin, it recognizes the semantic value of characters and emphasizes that.

General objectives

1. Allow learners of spoken chinese to read as much as possible using their phonetic knowledge of spoken forms, but supplemented with semantic knowledge of the most common characters or components. The key obstacle for learners of Chinese, which is not found in languages using alphabets, is that they cannot acquire vocabulary from reading, especially if they reside outside a Chinese speaking locality. With Transitional Pinyin, they can acquire vocabulary much more quickly, especially when reading on the Web.
2. Use Web display technologies to allow user control of options for display.
   

Common policies (all stages)
Secondary readings are always transcribed as Pinyin (or some other visual indicator consistent with chosen display mode).


Stage 1: Familiarity with up to 500 characters, and a corresponding vocabulary (identify what part of HSK vocabulary should be covered)

Objective:
Develop familiarity with about 170 Radical Characters that are frequently used. Develop familiarity with the most important Hanzi families, by frequent exposure to the family "head": base component characters, or the most frequently-used radical+base form. Hanzi family is defined as a group of characters which share a phonetic component, as well as a pronunciation with the same initial and rhyme, but may have a different tone. All tones for characters are marked.
Stage 1 will use Hanzi to distinguish homophonic variants of a syllable or word (considering two syllables homophones if they have the same initial and rhyme, but possibly differing tones), considering only the most productive families and open class words.

Policies

1. All functional morphemes are spelled in Pinyin.
2. Foreign proper names and loan words are spelled as in international English (with Pinyin available as a mouse over).
3. Only 500 Han characters are used, and tones are marked for them. All other words and morphemes are written in Pinyin with tone marks.
4. Other characters in the same family as the 500 are optionally displayed, some simpler indicator is the default with Han character displayed upon mouse-over.
   
5. All the 500 Han characters are selected from the 1000 most frequently used based on corpus studies. Families with more or more productive members are preferred.
   
6. Words are separated by spaces, following a standard to be defined. As an intermediate policy, it will follow the spacing of words in the ABC Dictionary of John DeFrancis and WenLin software.
   
7. The Han characters are used as syllables in open class words (notional word categories, like noun, verb, adverb).

Stage 2: 1000 character forms (head forms of families, or selected singletons) of open class words.

Objective
Use characters to distinguish common syllables that are homophonic (ignoring tone, which is explicitly marked). Near-homophones (that have a different but related initial or rhyme or both) are prioritized for Pinyin representation.

Policies.

1. 1000 forms are displayed.
2. All family-related forms (differing in radical and tone) will also be displayed by default. Some options: the radical is displayed in a different color, with a brief definition of the character and word upon mouse-over.
   
3. In addition to the 1000 character forms, all functional morphemes can be displayed as characters as a non-default option.

Stage 3. 2000+ forms

Policies
By default, all text is Hanzi but readings of a character that is not homophonic to the base form have an underline and Pinyin is displayed upon mouseover. Other options are 1) selective interlinear Pinyin (ruby text) 2) Pinyin is default for any reading not in homophonic to the regular Hanzi families, with the Hanzi form available as mouse-over, ruby or after the syllable/word.

Semantically-Annotated Pinyin Variants

All text is in Pinyin, but homophonic families (of open class words) are identified by various display options. Semantically related near-homophones are also available with a different visual indicator. The display options include: two kinds of underlining, with mouse overs; display base character and and radical separately, with a mnemonic available for exploration. Differen variants can be aligned with the various stages.

Related Concepts

Productivity
The productivity of a family base form is a function of the number of members, the closeness of pronunciation (including identical tones), the frequency of the characters in a corpus, and the frequency of words using the character in the HSK and similar learner vocabularies.

Next Steps

Prepare a text in this style, perhaps Quotations of Chairman Mao, or a culturally annotated reader based on it.

Consider how web display technology can allow the various options.

1-3P Scheme solution to zombies and Mary's Room

I believe I have some useful elements to a solution to the mind-body problem. It is consistent with Searle's biological naturalism (Rediscovery of Mind) and Nagel's expansionist conception of physical mind. It partly comes from a dissatisfaction with the Antecedent Physicalism defended by John Perry in his Nicod Lectures (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness). Perry defend's type-identity property physicalism, but doesn't point out how same token situation seen under differing aspects can have two compatible situation-types of an intrinsically different epitemological nature.

For me we need to recognize that mental entities are viewed from a qualitatively different aspect than reductively-physical entities. Mental-and-still-physical entities are picked out using a First-and-Third-Person scheme of individuation, while r-physical entities are picked out using a strictly Third-Person scheme. Mental entities are physical in an expanded sense, not in the reductive sense of traditional physicalism. Mental types are not directly perceived, but are "unseen things" reliably inferred from cognizing the behavior of conspecifics as meaningfully caused by internal mental states. This "theory of other minds" faculty is innate in (non-autistic) humans, and endows mental entities with qualia in addition to r-physical properties.

Qualia have a special kind of warrant compared to r-physical properties. Of course there are many physical properties we know without directly perceiving, properties that are directly inferrable from what we know about how the world works. This could be common sense constraints based on unaided perception, but in today's educated discourse in includes scientific constraints that ultimately rely on elaborate instrument-aided observations and (empiricist) theory-building within a strictly 3P scheme. Human knowledge of mental entities is warranted by 1-3P properties of entities that we don't directly observe. We have a cognitive certainty that a causal mental state token that is readily inferrable in a conspecific is of the same type (simple or compositionally constructed) that we would use to classify a possible token of that type in ourselves. We associate a 1P property with the token in ourselves, and extend it via the mental type to reliably attribute the same 1P property (qualia) to the observed conspecific with that mental state.

So from this perspective, are philosophical zombies possible? No, because the proposal of a creature that is physically identical to a thinking person, but has no qualia, ignores some of the 1-3P interactions of neural cells (and physical entities beyond) that dynamically shape a thinking person (both biological ontogenic development such as normal grammar, and cultural learning such as vocabulary). Mentally capable humans are explainable in terms of physical microparticles and their interactions, only if we admit 1-3P schemes as interactions between firing nerve cells and the intentional object situations (including situation with mental states) they are directed towards. And instances of these intentional mental types do cause behavior in the world, they do not merely supervene. Causation involves types, constraints between situation types, not just token situations. And some types are from 1-3P schemes.

What does Mary know when she comes out of the black and white room? First of all, her 1-3P scheme for colored entities is not relevantly similar to that of most color-sighted people. It is as if Mary is developmentally color-blind. If by some chance it turns out that Mary (or let us say her brother Mario) is genetically color-blind as well, then we have no reason to think that Mario will have qualia relevantly identical to normally color-sighted people, he will have a neural basis more like color-blind people with no qualia for red. Now if Mary has normal rod cells in her retina, she will be like the cats whose v1 was altered so that they do not have normal binocular rivalry. Mary will have to acquire a scheme of individuation for colors like red, and since it has a developmentally delayed neural basis, it may or may not be normal in its functional capacities, and the associated qualia may be quite different. We can't really know about the similarity of qualia, since we cannot assume a relevantly similar neural-cultural infrastructure.

Returning to the two-aspect terminology we can say that a naturalistic explanation of mind requires a recognition of supra-structural interactions in a 1-3P scheme, as well as infra-structural physical interactions at the level of neurophysiology that a reductive physicalist would recognize. The phrase supra-structural is not meant to imply anything supernatural. On the contrary, culture is embedded in nature and layered above the level of interactions that can be reduced to microparticles and the regularities of their 3P interactions.

1-3P regularities in cognitive schemes are not ontologically suspect, their existence is in the same token situations that a physiologist can observe with instruments, but the mental entities are individuated with the (innate then culturally developed) human cognitive capacity to pick out other minds, to readily infer the mental states causing observed behavior in conspecifics. Part of the the special warrant for these unseen mental entities in the attributed qualia, which to the extent we can confirm them with verbal communication give us an irrefutable confidence that other humans experience mental states just like we experience ourselves via our neuro-"kinesthetic" intuitions above and beyond our perceptual intuitions (in Kant's sense). External perceptions are extra-subjective, and thus epistemologically-objective "presentations" (Kant's representations) of uncontroversially ontologically-objective external entities. Cognition of mental states is inter-subjective, and in some way e-subjective (but grounded in e-objective perceptions of behavior, and confirmed by interactive social and verbal communication) "presentations" of inner causal states. Those inner causal states are just as o-objective as any other kind of entity, its just that they are of a kind within a 1-3P scheme, with their warrant supported by specifically 1-3P properties or qualia attributed to the observed conspecific. Socially (especially verbally) we cannot deny that other humans have experience and a mental life, the specific mental states of those unseen causes are just what we classify in ourselves with the same 1-3P scheme we use for the mental causes of all human behavior. Beliefs, desires and mental states are not mysterious supernatural entities, they are o-objective entities that we pick out with a e-subjective (or epistemologically inter-subjective, and socially certain) scheme. The extension of the mental state is not merely internal to a brain, it is the species-wide innate uniformity of neural structures, and society-wide (including speech-community-wide) conventions that make up a shared scheme of individuation. With a broad view of mental content, the world situations that shape the intentional mental states of humans are also part of the regularities in a 1-3P scheme, and are part of the extension of a mental state.

A theory of intentionality is not sufficient, though that can explain 3P schemes used to pick out reductively-physical entities. In addition, we have other kinds of social (but still physical, in an expansionist conception) interactions embodied in innate-cultural schemes. The mental types of these schemes cause behavior, that is a certainty we have about experience and mental life in ourselves and conspecifics. It is a kind of knowledge that is warranted, not by reductive empiricism, but by the special warrant of 1-3P schemes. We need an expanded physicalism that accepts those 1-3P schemes a supra-structural level of interaction between physiological bodies and their physical microparticles. The vocabulary of physical science (biochemistry, physiology) is not sufficient to explain experience and our certainties about mental life in ourselves and others, we need to expand it to cover mental entities and 1-3P schemes, things that are not ontologically suspect but a sound foundation for continuing research in cognitive science.

In a way, these elements are very much in tune with Perry's interests in reflexivity and indexicality. He pioneered with Barwise the use of schemes of individuation underlying situation-types. Although he may be still unwilling to take some of the steps I suggest, his use of the term "antecedent physicalism" makes me think that he is open to going beyond reductive physicalism, especially if the additional apparatus can account for indexicality and reflexivity. I think a broad research agenda in cognitive science is opening up along the path that Perry is blazing, and it only takes a few more steps to see key elements to a solution to the mind-body problem.

Balancing Fossil Energy Consumption and Population

I have long been planning to write an essay debunking some myths about overpopulation, but still promoting family planning as part of a larger package for community development. I just watched a TV Ontario show (the Agenda with Steve Paikin, "Population and the Planet") thanks to Miro. This started me thinking about this again, and an outline follows. I could try to write this up and send it to a national newspaper for their editorial page.

- balancing life extension and birth rates
- demographic transition is happening, pace of transition needs managing
- false trade off with economic development, eco growth means fossil energy consumption growth
- Malthus and Ehrlich
- technology, much is
- urgency: hundred months
- illusion of national aggregates in both pop and econ


- draw down natural "capital"
- biocapacity with dynamic technology, footprint
- disaggregate: big-provincial-small islands, urban rural, top-quarter mid-half bottom-quarter income distribution

Solution
- community management capacity building
- participatory planning
- manage consumption-population balance, under dynamic technique
- change the shape of the community population pyramid
- identify state of exploitation-development of natural and built-up resources
- shift from fossil-energy consumption model to sustainable model
- incorporate closest cities, island and income distribution into model
- population side interventions, in order of priority
- education and health of women
- late maternity (pledge and incentives)
- available family planning services (both natural and artificial contraception work)
- health care participation
- spacing (schooling-related incentives)
- explicit fertility reduction targets at community level

Explicit fertility reduction targets at a national level only make sense when over half of communities have been organized to define targets at community level (a community is a metropolitan area or a cluster of similar municipalities within a province, about the size of a congressional district)

Legislative support is a discretionary spending package to municipalities which plan and manage their resource-population balance

Notes on Kant's Vocabulary

So far, this is just a rearrangement of Palmquist's Glossary of Kant. It helps me clarify Kant's system, I juxtapose the key distinctions. Later I may try to add some notes. For Kant, "ideas" means something big and eternal, like Plato's Ideas or Forms, special concepts like God, freedom and immortality. My earlier posts on ideas relate to what Kant calls "concepts," of a pedestrian type.

Kant uses four perspectives, and rejects a fifth. This approach is what he means by a critical approach. He applies this approach to three standpoints, producing his three Critiques.

I take what might be called a cognitivist stance towards Kant's transcendental perspective. Rather that have some inflated ontological importance, the transcendental approach is simply a precursor to modern cognitive psychology. It generates hypothesis of the underlying structure of mind, which can be studied at various levels. I would apply at least two levels: an expansionist conception of mind, while allowing this to be grounded in the neurophysiology of the brain and ennervated bodies.

Kant's main argument is about whether "synthetic a priori judgements" are possible, so those distinctions are presented next. Other distinctions are his representations and faculties, and a few other contrasts. Then there is a set of concepts related to his Ethics, then a bunch of leftover terms

4 Perspectives
transcendental, empirical, logical and hypothetical
old metaphysics: speculative

perspective: a way of thinking about or considering something; or a set of assumptions from which an object can be viewed. Knowing which perspec­tive is assumed is important because the same question can have different an­swers if different perspectives are assumed. Kant himself does not use this word, but he uses a number of other expressions (such as standpoint, way of thinking, employment of understanding, etc.) in precisely this way. The main Critical perspectives are the transcendental, empirical, logical and hypothetical.

transcendental: one of Kant's four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both synthetic and a priori. It is a special type of philosophical knowledge, concerned with the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. However, Kant believes all knowing subjects assume certain transcendental truths, whether or not they are aware of it. Transcendental knowledge defines the boundary between empirical knowledge and speculation about the transcendent realm. 'Every event has a cause' is a typical transcendental statement. (Cf. empirical.)

transcendental object: an object considered transcendentally insofar as it has been presented to a subject, but is not yet represented in any determined way-i.e., not yet influenced by space and time or by the categories. Also called an 'object in general'.

empirical: one of Kant's four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both synthetic and a posteriori. Most of the knowledge we gain through ordinary experience, or through science, is empirical. 'This table is brown' is a typical empirical statement. (Cf. transcendental).

logical: one of Kant's four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both analytic and a priori. Hence it is concerned with nothing but the relationships between concepts. The law of noncontradiction (A is not -A) is the fundamental law of traditional, Aristotelian logic. (If we call this 'analytic' logic, then 'synthetic' logic would be based on the oppo­site law of 'contradiction' [A is -A].) 'All bachelors are unmarried' is a typical logical statement. (Cf. hypothetical.)

hypothetical: one of Kant's four main perspectives, aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which is both analytic and a posteriori (though Kant him­self wrongly identified it as synthetic and a priori). Most metaphysical knowledge is properly viewed from this perspective, instead of from the spec­ulative perspective of traditional metaphysics. 'There is a God' is a typical hypothetical statement. (Cf. logical).

speculative: the illusory perspective which wrongly uses reason in a hope­less attempt to gain knowledge about something transcendent. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of theoretical.

Critical: Kant's lifelong approach to philosophy which distinguishes be­tween different perspectives and then uses such distinctions to settle otherwise unresolvable disputes. The Critical approach is not primarily negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate quarrels by showing the ways in which both sides have a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly understood. Kant's system of Critical philosophy emphasizes the importance of examin­ing the structure and limitations of reason itself.

Critique: to use the method of synthesis together with a critical approach to doing philosophy. This term appears in the titles of the three main books in Kant's Critical philosophy, which adopt the theoretical, practical and judicial standpoints, respectively. The purpose of Critical philosophy is to prepare a secure foundation for metaphysics. (Cf. metaphysics.)

metaphysics: the highest form of philosophy, which attempts to gain knowledge of the ideas. Because the traditional, speculative perspective fails to succeed in this task, Kant suggests a new, hypothetical perspective for metaphysics. Metaphysics can succeed only when it is preceded by Critique. (Cf. Critique.)

3 Stand­points
theoretical, practical and judicial

standpoint: the special type of perspective which determines the point from which a whole system of perspectives is viewed. The main Critical stand­points are the theoretical, practical and judicial.

theoretical: one of Kant's three main standpoints, relating primarily to cognition-i.e., to what we know as opposed to what we feel or desire to do. Theoretical reason is concerned with questions about our knowledge of the ordinary world (the world science seeks to understand). Finding the source of such knowledge is the task of the first Critique, which would best be entitled the Critique of Pure 'Theoretical' Reason. (Cf. practical and judicial; see speculative.)

practical: one of Kant's three main standpoints, relating primarily to action -i.e., to what we desire to do as opposed to what we know or feel. Practical reason is a synonym for will; and these two terms are concerned with ques­tions of morality. Finding the sources of such action is the task of the second Critique. (Cf. theoretical and judicial.)

judicial: one of Kant's three main standpoints, relating primarily to experi­ence-i.e., to what we feel, as opposed to what we know or desire to do. Judicial reason is virtually synonymous with 'Critique' itself, and is con­cerned with questions about the most profound ways in which we experience the world. Finding the source of two examples of such experiences is the task of the third Critique. (Cf. theoretical and practical.)

system: a set of basic facts or arguments (called 'elements') arranged accord­ing to the order of their logical relationships, as determined by the architec­ton­ic patterns of reason. Kant's Critical philosophy is a System made up of three sub­ordinate systems, each defined by a distinct standpoint, and each made up of the same four perspectives.

Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms

by Stephen Palmquist (stevepq@hkbu.edu.hk)

The following Glossary lists Kant's most important technical terms, to­gether with a simple definition of each. (The terms 'judicial', 'perspective' and 'standpoint' are the only ones Kant himself does not use as technical terms.) It was originally written as a study aide to help make the intricate web of Kant's termi­nology comprehensible to students who had little or no fa­mil­iar­i­ty with Kant's writings. Where relevant, the opposite term is given in curved brackets at the end of the definition. When a word defined herein (or a slight­ly different form of such a word) is used in the course of defining some other word in this Glossary, its first occurrence in that definition will be in italics.

a posteriori: a way of gaining knowledge by appealing to some particular experience(s). This method is used to establish empirical and hypothetical truths. (Cf. a priori.)

a priori: a way of gaining knowledge without appealing to any particular experience(s). This method is used to establish transcendental and logical truths. (Cf. a posteriori.)

analytic: a statement or an item of knowledge which is true solely because of its conformity to some logical laws. (Cf. synthetic.)

synthetic: a statement or item of knowledge which is known to be true because of its connection with some intuition. (Cf. analytic.)

analysis: division of a representation into two opposing representations, with a view towards clarifying the original representation. Philosophy as metaphysics employs analysis more than synthesis. (Cf. synthesis.)

synthesis: integration of two opposing representations into one new repre­sentation, with a view towards constructing a new level of the object's real­ity. Philosophy as Critique employs synthesis more than analysis. On the operation of synthesis in the first Critique, see imagination. (Cf. analysis.)

appearance: an object of experience, when viewed from the transcendental perspective. Though often used as a synonym for phenomenon, it technically refers to an object considered to be conditioned by space and time, but not by the categories. (Cf. thing in itself.)

thing in itself: an object considered transcendentally apart from all the conditions under which a subject can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)

phenomenon: the object of knowledge, viewed empirically, in its fully knowable state (i.e., conditioned by space and time and the categories). (Cf. noumenon.)

noumenon: the name given to a thing when it is viewed as a transcendent object. The term 'negative noumenon' refers only to the recognition of some­thing which is not an object of sensible intuition, while 'positive noumenon' refers to the (quite mistaken) attempt to know such a thing as an empirical object. These two terms are sometimes used loosely as synonyms for 'transcendental object' and 'thing in itself', respectively. (Cf. phenomenon.)

representation: the most general word for an object at any stage in its de­termination by the subject, or for the subjective act of forming the object at that level. The main types of representations are intuitions, concepts and ideas. In the first Critique, the understanding is the dominant faculty in processing representations, while in the third Critique the faculty of imagination is dominant. Sometimes translated as 'presentation'.

concept: the active species of representation, by means of which our under­standing enables us to think. By requiring perceptions to conform to the categories, concepts serve as 'rules' allowing us to perceive general relations be­tween representations. (Cf. intuition.)

intuition: the passive species of representation, by means of which our sen­sibility enables to have sensations. By requiring appearances to be given in space and time, intuitions allow us to perceive particular relations between representations, thereby limiting empirical knowledge to the sensible realm. (Cf. concept.)

categories: the most general concepts, in terms of which every object must be viewed in order for it to become an object of empirical knowledge. The four main categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) each have three sub-categories, forming a typical example of a twelvefold, architectonic pattern. (Cf. space and time.)

architectonic: the logical structure given by reason (especially through the use of twofold and threefold divisions), which the philosopher should use as a plan to organize the contents of any system.

ideas: the species of representation which gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special concepts which arise out of our knowledge of the empirical world, yet seem to point beyond nature to some transcendent realm. The three most important metaphysical ideas are God, freedom and immortality.

experience: the combination of an intuition with a concept in the form of a judgment. 'Experience' in this 'mediate' sense is a synonym for 'empirical knowledge'. The phrase 'possible experience' refers to a representation which is presented to our sensibility through intuition, but is not yet known, because it has not been presented to our understanding through concepts. 'Experience' in this sense is 'immediate' and contrasts with 'knowledge'.

judgment: in the first Critique, the use of the understanding by which an object is determined to be empirically real, through a synthesis of intuitions and concepts. The third Critique examines the form of our feelings of pleasure and displeasure in order to construct a system based on the faculty of judg­ment (= the judicial standpoint) in its aesthetic and teleological manifesta­tions. (Cf. reason.)

object: a general term for any 'thing' which is conditioned by the subject's representation, and so is capable of being known. The thing in itself is a thing which cannot become an object. (Cf. subject; see thing in itself.)

subject: a general term for any rational person who is capable of having knowledge. (Cf. object; see also representation.)

objective: related more to the object or representation out of which knowl­edge is constructed than to the subject possessing the knowledge. Considered transcendentally, objective knowledge is less certain than subjective knowl­edge; considered empirically, objective knowledge is more certain. (Cf. sub­jective.)

subjective: related more to the subject than to the object or representation out of which knowledge is constructed. Considered transcendentally, subjec­tive knowledge is more certain that objective knowledge; considered empiri­cally, subjective knowledge is less certain. (Cf. objective.)

faculty: a fundamental power of human subjects to do something or perform some rational function.

understanding: in the first Critique, the faculty concerned with actively producing knowledge by means of concepts. This is quite similar to what is normally called the mind. It gives rise to the logical perspective, which en­ables us to compare concepts with each other, and to the empirical perspective (where it is also called judgment), which enables us to combine concepts with intuitions in order to produce empirical knowledge. The first Critique exam­ines the form of our cognitions in order to construct a system based on the faculty of understanding (= the theoretical standpoint). (Cf. sensibility.)

sensibility: the faculty concerned with passively receiving objects. This is accomplished primarily in the form of physical and mental sensations (via 'outer sense' and 'inner sense', respectively). However, such sensations are possible only if the objects are intuited, and intuition depends on space and time existing in their pure form as well. (Cf. understanding.)

imagination: the faculty responsible for forming concepts out of the 'manifold of intuition' and for synthesizing intuitions with concepts to form objects which are ready to be judged.

schematism: the function of the faculty of imagination, through which concepts and intuitions are combined, or synthesized, according to a rule (called a schema). In the first Critique, this function is presented as one of the steps required in order for the understanding to produce empirical knowledge.

conscience: the faculty of the human subject which enforces the moral law in a particular way for each individual by providing an awareness of what is right and wrong in each situation.

reason: in the first Critique, the highest faculty of the human subject, to which all other faculties are subordinated. It abstracts completely from the conditions of sensibility. The second Critique examines the form of our de­sires in order to construct a system based on the faculty of reason (= the prac­tical standpoint). Reason's primary function is practical; its theoretical func­tion, though often believed to be more important, should be viewed as having a secondary importance. (Cf. judgment.)

will: the manifestation of reason in its practical form (see practical). The two German words, 'Willkür' and 'Wille' can both be translated in English as 'will'. Willkür refers to the faculty of choice, which for Kant is just one (empirical) function of the more fundamental faculty of practical reason (= Wille).

knowledge: the final goal of the understanding in combining intuitions and concepts. If they are pure, the knowledge will be transcendental; if they are impure, the knowledge will be empirical. In a looser sense, 'knowledge' also refers to that which arises out adopting any legitimate perspective.

constitutive: playing a fundamental role in making up some type of knowledge. (Cf. regulative.)

regulative: providing important guidelines for how knowledge should be used, yet not itself playing any fundamental role in making up that knowl­edge. (Cf. constitutive.)

sensible: presented to the subject by means of sensibility. (Cf. intelligible.)

pure: not mixed with anything sensible. Although its proper opposite is 'impure', Kant normally opposes 'pure' to 'empirical'.

intelligible: presented to the subject without any material being provided by sensibility. It is more or less equivalent to the terms supersensible and transcendent. (Cf. sensible.)

supersensible: see intelligible and transcendent.

transcendent: the realm of thought which lies beyond the boundary of pos­sible knowledge, because it consists of objects which cannot be presented to us in intuition-i.e., objects which we can never experience with our senses (sometimes called noumena). The closest we can get to gaining knowledge of the transcendent realm is to think about it by means of ideas. (The opposite of 'transcendent' is 'immanent'.)

rational: grounded in the faculty of reason rather than in sensibility. (See also intelligible.)

formal: the active or subjective aspect of something-that is, the aspect which is based on the rational activity of the subject. (Cf. material.)

material: the passive or objective aspect of something-that is, the aspect which is based on the experience a subject has, or on the objects given in such an experience. (Cf. formal.)

moral law: the one 'fact' of practical reason, which is in every rational per­son, though some people are more aware of it than others. The moral law, in essence, is our knowledge of the difference between good and evil, and our in­ner conviction that we ought to do what is good. (See categorical impera­tive.)

categorical imperative: a command which expresses a general, unavoid­able requirement of the moral law. Its three forms express the requirements of universalizability, respect and autonomy. Together they establish that an action is properly called 'morally good' only if (1) we can will all persons to do it, (2) it enables us to treat other persons as ends and not merely as the means to our own selfish ends, and (3) it allows us to see other persons as mutual law-makers in an ideal 'realm of ends'.

duty: an action which we are obligated to perform out of respect for the moral law.

religion: the way of acting, or perspective, according to which we interpret all our duties as divine commands.

autonomy: an action which is determined by the subject's own free choice (see will). In the second Critique, moral action is defined as being au­tono­mous. (Cf. heteronomy.)

heteronomy: an action which is determined by some outside influence (i.e., some force other than the freedom given by practical reason, such as inclina­tion) impelling the subject to act in a certain way. Such action is nonmoral (i.e., neither moral nor immoral). (Cf. autonomy.)

inclination: the faculty or object which motivates a person to act in a heteronomous way. Following inclinations is neither morally good nor morally bad, except when doing so directly prevents a person from acting ac­cording to duty-i.e., only when choosing to obey an inclination results in disobedience to the moral law.

disposition: the tendency a person has at a given point in time to act in one way or another (i.e., to obey the moral law or to disobey it). (Cf. predis­position.)

predisposition: the natural tendency a person has, apart from (or before having) any experience, to be morally good or evil. (Cf. disposition.)

maxim: the material rule or principle used to guide a person in a particular situation about what to do (e.g., 'I should never tell a lie'). It thus provides a kind of bridge between a persons inner disposition and outer actions.

aesthetic: having to do with sense-perception. In the first Critique this word refers to space and time as the necessary conditions for sense-perception. The first half of the third Critique examines the subjective purposiveness in our perception of beautiful or sublime objects in order to construct a system of aesthetic judgment. (Cf. teleological.)

Copernican revolution: in astronomy, the theory that the earth revolves around the sun; in philosophy, the (analogous) theory that the subject of knowledge does not remain at rest, but revolves around (i.e., actively deter­mines certain aspects of) the object. Thus, the formal characteristics of the empirical world (i.e., space and time and the categories) are there only because the subject's mind puts them there, transcendentally.

faith: a rational attitude towards a potential object of knowledge which arises when we are subjectively certain it is true even though we are unable to gain theo­retical or objective certainty. By contrast, knowledge implies objective and subjective certainty, while opinion is the state of having neither objective nor subjective certainty. Kant encouraged a more humble approach to philoso­phy by claiming to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith-i.e., by dis­­tinguishing between what we can know empirically and what is transcen­dent, which we can approach only by means of faith.

reality: if regarded from the empirical perspective, this refers to the ordinary world of nature; if regarded from the transcendental perspective, it refers to the transcendent realm of the noumenon.

space and time: considered from the empirical perspective, they form the context in which objects interact outside of us; considered from the transcen­dental perspective, they are pure, so they exist inside of us as conditions of knowledge. (Cf. categories.)

summum bonum: Latin for highest good. This is the ultimate goal of the moral system presented in the second Critique; it involves the ideal distribu­tion of happiness in exact proportion to each person's virtue. In order to con­ceive of its possibility, we must postulate the existence of God and human immortality, thus giving these ideas practical reality.

teleological: having to do with purposes or ends. The second half of the third Critique examines the objective purposiveness in our perception of natural organisms in order to construct a system of teleological judgment.

time: see space and time.

On the ontology of ideas

Plato, Aristotle, Saussure

Plato thought Ideas, or the Forms, existed in an ultimate reality of essential types whose immutable existence demoted the world of experience to a lower ontological status of of appearances. Aristotle rejected Ideas, and proposed hylomorphic substances (ousia, perhaps this could be translated as Substantives to avoid the confusion with ordinary and chemical substantives), that those beings that could bear predicates had inseparable matter and form.

Descartes was familiar with Aristotle's hylomorphism of Substantives, but felt that it only applied to res extensa (extensional things). He was searching to demarcate the domain of natural philosophy from the domain of theology, with Galileo's censure from the church posing an ethical and philosophical dilemma for him (but not for us). Descartes solution was a Substantive dualism, to accept hylomorphism for concrete things in spacetime (res extensa) but not for moral beings (res cogitans) like angels and souls. For the domain of moral beings, Descartes accepted the principles of theology, and used a Platonic ontology of pure ideas.

Descartes' Substantive Dualism is still with us, not that many philosophical thinkers actually advocate it, but it sets up some ontological distinctions that still bedevil us in dealing with the mind-body problem. Descartes linked the ontological distinction of Material-Substantives and Ideal-Substantives with the epistemological distinctions of empirical grounding of certainty and a rational grounding of certainty. On the issue of first principles, Descartes came down on the rationalist side, using a priori introspection to achieve certainty of self. This inaugurates an individualist stance in Western philosophy, and attributes to introspection powers that perhaps exceed what is justified by science or philosophy. Decartes put the Ideal part of the distinction of Material-Substantive and Ideal-the issue of Substantive, as the basis for a rationalist a priori certain knowledge, conceding this crucial territory to the authority of theology. It was a strategic retreat from Galileo's theory-informed empiricism, that lead to the Copernican convictions that got him in trouble with the church. Descartes retreated to secure a large territory for empirical science, which flourished in the succeding centuries.

After Newton put celestial mechanics on a mathematical foundation, Galileo's Copernican outlook gained dominance with the New Physics that he inaugurated. Kant revisited issue of the ontological grounding of certain knowledge, and sided with Hume rather than Descartes. he introduced the additional distinction of synthetic vs. analytical judgments. A posteriori judgments were already the domain of science, but a priori judgments were still subject to old-style metaphysics. Kant's new critical metaphysics tried to recover the synthetic part of a priori judgments for science. (Analytic a priori judgments were already the domain of logic). Kant did this my limiting the powers of what was accessible to human knowledge in principle. We cannot know the thing-in-itself.

Signifier and signified, applying an expansionist conception mind to language evolution

I've been writing some notes an how an expansionist solution (via 1-3P schemes) to the Mind-Body program can be relevant to linguistic signs.

Sign

1. Actual-Signifier
1. Acoustic-Event-Instance classified as a Phoneme-String in a Utterance Situation-Type; or
2. Inscription-Token classified as a Parsed-Character-String (distinguish alphabetic and Chinese character cases)
2. Mental-Signified
1. Mental-Event-Instance (Instance of a Mental-State, a type)
1. A Mental-Sentence (at type, a Mental-State), constructed from lexical types in a mental lexicon using the combining rules of syntax with to generate a Shared Information State
2. Intentional-Object (the extramental situation of a cognized situation-type)
1. The propositional content of the mental sentence
2. Further constrained by the pragmatic situation, where speaker and hearer have Desires, Volitions and Commitments as they use Sentences in speech acts
   
3. Scheme of Individuation
1. 3P Scheme for situations where all individuals are physical
1. Scheme applied to concrete physical situations, the immediate utterance context
2. Scheme applied to possible physical situations, e.g. planning for the future or recovering an uncertain past
2. 1-3P Scheme where some individuals are Mental-States (Sign-using Agent uses a propositional attitude verb to characterize the cause of behavior -- belief, desire, plan -- of another Agent)
1. Scheme applied to immediate situation involving concrete persons with souls, the intelocutor or directly observed people
2. Scheme applied to possible situations involving persons with souls
1. Future situations, e.g. plans involving people, the people in the past and the causes of their behavior
2. Recovering uncertain past situations involving people and their behavior
3. Fictional situations

Case 1: Spoken Utterrances about Immediate Concrete Situation, No Mental States involved

1. Spoken Utterance, Assertive
1. Acoustic Event (channel is the air)
2. Phoneme String (generation at source and recognition at receiver)
3. Sincerity conditions involve the Volitional Act of the Speaker
4. 3P Scheme of Individuation includes the Language Code shared by Speaker and Hearer

Case 2: Speech Acts involving the Desires, Volitions and Commitments of Interlocutors
- propositional content involves only 3P Scheme
- conditions of satisfaction involve mental states of the 1st-Speaker; replies may involve the mental states of the Hearer-2nd-Speaker


Case 3: Written Communication Acts about purely physical situations

1. The writing situation
2. The reading situation
3. The described situation
1. Concrete situation of writer
2. Concrete situation of reader (e.g. a manual with a task description)
3. Possible situations remote from reader and writer
1. Fictional situations

Case 4: Spoken Assertive Utterances about Human Behavior and Mental Causes


Case n: Written Communication Acts about physical-intentional situations


Animals with nervous systems can control motor schemas
- usually routine motor patterns
- sometimes involving selection between alternative motor-responses
- generally reflexive or instinctive, pro-volitional choice not higher cognitive Volition
- ingesting food, avoiding pain, acquiring prey, fleeing predators, mating behaviors, grooming behaviors

Animals with eyes and other sensory organs (molluscs, insects, vertebrates)
- neurally generate a percept
- percept-schemas can modulate behavior routine
- information-use behavior, where perception classifies a situation for selecting action
- this is a information-mediated feedback cycle, the nervous system is an analog control which internally governs its set points (constrained by biological survival and function)

Social animals classify the behavior of conspecifics (as well as prey, predators and commensals)

1. gestural and vocal displays create a shared 1-3P scheme to classify display behaviors
2. A mutually understood display carries a shared information state between producer and receiver
3. A display is a Signifier, the Shared Information State (including the mental types that combined to create it, and the occurrent representation of the state in working memory) is the Signified
4. The Signified is itself an intentional mental state, that has the property of directedness to some extramental situation

The extramental situation classified as a Shared Information State may be concrete, but may also have a possible situation as referent.

How did hominid memory evolve with language? Birds already have something like phonological organization of birdsong, and can recognize songs as well, presumably by their "phonemes". But they may have only a fixed repertoire of pattern schemas, perhaps nothing as productive as human speech (which is recursively generative). Also, the Signifier of a bird's song apparently has no signified, there is no lexical semantics behind the musical phrases of the song to construct a shared information state.

Presumably, the specialized vocalizations of primates (hawk-warning call vs. snake-warning call produces run-down vs. run-up behaviors) create some kind of shared information state. This could be part of the ready structure innovatively applied to semantically enable language in hominids.

Stage 1. Let us imagine a hominid species that can consistently make referring vocalizations (noun phrases), but does not yet have verbs and predications. The hominids can classify individuals using arbitary vocal signifiers. The culturally acquired repertoire of Signs is a shared scheme. it may be only a 3P scheme.

Stage 2. Let us imagine that in addition to referring vocalizations, the hominids evolve certain basic verbs to classify non-mental actions. Perhaps they use learn the 5 constructions often used by human children, and this protolanguage includes the 14 basic verbs observed (by Adele Goldberg) in those constructions:

put	X causes Y to move Z
go	X moves Y
do	X acts on Y
make	X causes Y to become Z
give	X causes Y to receive Z

Similar to go: get-1, fall, come, look, live, sit
Similar to put: get-2, take, do-2, pick
Similar to give: tell

These verbs already involve the intentional action of agents, but do not yet individuates their mentals state that might be causing their behavior.

Presumably the hominids with this 14-verb language already have a theory of other minds, they are normal social mammals not autistic. However, they still lack a vocabulary of pick out unseen mental causes as individuals.

Stage 3. Let us not imagine that the use of language of this hominid species evolves to include words like: believes, wants, plans, intends, sees, hears, requests, and promises.

How does the structure of cognitive memory of this hominid species have to evolve through each stage?

Nagel on an expansionist conception of mind

"Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem"

Nagel says his position is similar to Colin McGinn but less pessimistic. I see that his position is compatible with Searle's biological naturalism, perhaps he is just dissatisfied with Searle's vague comments about emergent phenomena. He accepts supervenience, but claims that is not yet an explanation.

My own explanation has been evolving for years, basically trying to apply Barwise's concept of a scheme of individuation, where I see the scheme for mental states to be intrinsically first-person as well as third person. This accounts for the explanatory gap.

Below are some rough notes I compiled while reading Nagel's article, perhaps I will have time to clean them us some day. If I need to clarify the concept of a "verbal scheme of individuation" as part of the foundation of lexical semantics (for my planned thesis work), maybe I will need to set aside some time to come up with a clearly argued essay.

Notes on Mind:

Elements of a solution to the mind-body problem

1. Nagel: expansionist conception of mental entities.
2. Peirce: type-token distinction
3. Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Barwise-Perry: atomism of situation-types
4. Searle: biological naturalism, introspection does not have complete access, epistemological-subjective can be ontological-objective
5. Perry: indexical reference?

Physicalists want an explanation of mind in terms of microparticles and their interactions. We don't need to invent any new particles, but we may need to expand the concept of interaction to allow for First-Person-Third-Person (1-3P) Schemes of Individuation.

A percept (available to any animal with eyes) is a (realist) type linking two glances at the same external object.
- below the level accessible to consciousness is the unity of neural activation patterns between saccades
- at the level of consciousness is the scanning of a scene, and integrating the successive visual impressions into a single recognition experience
- integration between perceptual modalities highlights the synesthetic experience, highly e-subjective

An occurrent concept is the interaction (within a type-level shared scheme of individuation) of two brain situation-types picking out "the same" shared information state.
- this generalizes the type-equivalence of two saccadic situation-types into a larger abstract situation-type which classifies the external token situations picked out by the two saccades, as well as future possible situation-tokens into the same type. The regularity of the external world is the wider type, but the narrow type is grounded in the regularities of a brain or several brains.
- social communication between mammals establishes externally communicated "concepts", including the precepts of a shared immediate situation.
- eye gaze ...


The token microparticles of a particular mental experience are primarily the spacetime-located firing brain cells of several individuals who shared the information states the caused the constituent concept-type elements of the experience, and secondarily the spacetime-located environment (both perceptible and enabling action) that is causally linked with those elements. The type of the mental experience is a complex relation classifying the firing processes of those brain cells and the relevant material environment via a shared scheme of individuation. The scheme is itself a biological (innate) and cultural (acquired) regularity grounded in the brain cells of an individual.

What is the gap between physical description and 1st-and-3rd-Person mental description? Physical description uses a 3P scheme, and the relations are non-dynamical and deterministic. Mental description uses a 1-3P scheme, which crucially references the 1P qualia of the mental entities.

A 1-3P scheme individuates mental entities that are literally unseen, but are readily inferrable from the observed behavior of a relevantly similar conspecific. The mental states are seen to cause the observed behavior, much as the observers own ocurrent mental states cause self-behavior via intention-in-action. The ability to cognize the unseen causal states in the minds of others is innate (in non-autistic individuals) in humans, and those mental states have intrinsic 1P properties (qualia) that are inherent in the use of a 1-3P scheme of individuation.

Mental causality is behavior caused by unseen mental states individuated through a 1-3P scheme.

Attunement to caused behavior, and the unseen mental causes that explain it, engages the hominid 1P understanding of the subject's ("my") mental will (states of intending-in-action) causing the kinesthetically accessed behavior. The kinesthetics of intention-in-action are 1P properties of the mental type, and thus are associated with an externally cognized token of that mental type as well as an introspectively cognized self-token.

The verbal-mental scheme is also 1P. The words for describing mental action (propositional attitudes) associate the "kinesthetics" of thinking a mental state with any external or internal token of that verbal type. Mental signifieds have 1P properties.

In this model, there are two layers. A mental event is a relation between nerve cells (not just the brain, the ennervated body is important) and the real or possible intentional-object of the event's mental "state". That Level One relation is part of a scheme of individuation, which could potentially be a private scheme (let us say for music at a high pitch that most humans can't hear). Then we ask what is the ontological grounding of that scheme? It turns out that there are two types of scheme, depending on an epistemological issue. Some schemes are strictly 3P, while schemes for classifying the mental states of others are 1-3P schemes, and attribute qualia to any token of the type. The qualia associated (felt, what-it-is-like-to-be) with a mental token of the observer is a neurophysiological "kinesthetic" access and very real. The qualia associated with the mental state of others is inferred, with the presupposition that they are physiologically relevantly similar in structure. The schemes are types that are grounded in species-innate regularities as well as acquired cultural concepts (notably verbal concepts), so cannot be reduced to the structure of one brain.

So occurrent mental events are tokens of a relation (a type of parametrized state of affairs where a hominid cognizes a real or possible situation). This relation exists as part of a scheme of individuation. A mental event of an actual physical object/event engages a strictly 3P scheme, so it is a ontologically objective brain state that is 3P cognized (thus epistemologically objective as well). If a mental event is about a possible situation, then it o-objective existence is in doubt, although that could be resolved to true with more information. Mental events about fictional 3P situations have no o-objective existence, their ontological status is purely o-subjective, although these cultural fictions may play an important role. So we can have 3P e-objective cognizing of o-subjective fictional situations. Now what if the observer is cognizing mental states in a conspecific? They cannot see mental states, but they can reliably infer the o-objective existence, using their 1P neurophysiological "kinesthetic" qualia to support a feeling of certainty about the existence of souls and their causal mental states. This is at some level a e-subjective cognizing of an o-objective mental state in others. We have intuitions of certainty about the o-objective existence of that unseen state, which we know using a 1-3P scheme. When a hominid cognizes its own mental state, it uses its 1-3P scheme to e-subjectively cognize, but their is even greater certainty of the o-objective existence of "clear and distinct ideas" with "kinesthetic" qualia. Of course even this 1P certainty can be mistaken, such as optical illusions, or confabulations, or delusions.

So a mental state does not require substance dualism, it is merely a token of a type in a scheme which may be 3P or 1-3P. It does not require property dualism either, since the gap between between 3P and 1-3P schemes can be explained by an expansionist conception of mind. Our expanded conception of "interaction of microparticles" only needs to encompass cognitive schemes of individuation. The explanatory gap about mental qualia emerges from the difference of 1-3P schemes (e-subjective, but usually o-objective if the mental state being picked out is actual) from 3P schemes (o-subjective, and usually o-objective if the intentional-object is actual).

Level One invokes Brentano's (and later Searle's) insight about Intentionality as the mark of the mental. At Level 2, we need Barwise's insights about schemes of individuation, and the recognition that some schemes (for recognizing mental states) are inherently 1-3P schemes. Level One is not controversial, but we need Peirce's insight about the type-token distinction, for use at level 2. The ontology of a scheme is controversial, since the 3P schemes lend themselves to a functionalist-physicalist reductionism. But I would take a neuro-chauvinist view that functionalist role-relation type is not adequate, a silicon realization would lack the physiological grounding to be physically the same. This is highlighted when we consider schemes of classifying mental states, where the phenomenology would be unavailable to funcationally similar robots, since the absence of physiology would make any "kinesthetic" qualia implausible, and two functionally similar states would not be the same mental state in a 1-3P scheme.

The explanatory gap can now be understood, and strong AI recedes as a prospect. Zombies turn out to be a confusion of reductionism, since a physiological zombie would not be functionally identical if it did not have a 1-3P scheme. The phenomenology cannot be separated from the physiology, and the e-subjective certainty about the identity of mental states is species-specific. Even if chimpanzees in a space colony were to evolve into human like intelligence, we wouldn't know what it is like to be a chimpanzee smelling a rose or eating a tea cake.